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Normativity and Objectivity in
Historical Writing
(My Dinner with Schlegel)
MATT STEILEN†
Dear friends do not provide the best material for
reflection. One’s nearness to them interferes in ways that are
usually undetectable until too late. Peculiar friends, in
contrast, require a labor of constant reflection. Why on earth
does he act that way? This Essay is for my dear and peculiar
friend, Jack Schlegel. It grows out of some readings we did
together before the pandemic and before the unrest that
followed the killing of George Floyd, a time that now feels
like an age ago. The subject was historiography and our
syllabus included Acton, Beard, Butterfield, Bloch, Carr, a
packaged introduction to the philosophy of history by R. F.
Atkinson, and a survey of modern historiography by Georg
Iggers.1 Collingwood was not assigned, but seemed to loiter

†Professor, University at Buffalo School of Law, State University of New York. I
am grateful to Jack Schlegel for a decade of friendship and mentoring here at
Buffalo. Thanks to Bert Westbrook for setting up this conference and for inviting
me to participate. For help with the Essay, thanks to Charles Barzun, Dan
Farbman, Fred Konefsky, Dan Priel, and Justin Simard.
1. See generally LORD ACTON, ESSAYS IN THE LIBERAL INTERPRETATION OF
HISTORY: SELECTED PAPERS (William H. McNeil ed., 1967); Charles A. Beard, That
Noble Dream, 41 AM. HIST. REV. 74 (1935); HERBERT BUTTERFIELD, THE WHIG
INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY (G. Bell & Sons 1963) (1931); MARC BLOCH, THE
HISTORIAN’S CRAFT (1953); EDWARD HALLETT CARR, WHAT IS HISTORY? (1961); R.
F. ATKINSON, KNOWLEDGE AND EXPLANATION IN HISTORY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
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in the background.2 Admittedly, the choice of readings was
pedestrian, and it answered no overarching plan or theory
(the Atkinson I discovered while browsing a used book store),
but for me the interactions with Schlegel were generative,
and anyway, setting down the outcome gives me the last
word. My subject will be objectivity. Rather than unpack
what Acton and our other sources said about objectivity, my
focus will be on Schlegel’s efforts to engage with the issue, in
light of their writings, and with my own efforts to engage
with Schlegel.
Let me begin with a sketch of my friend, of his scholarly
penchants and the particular historical outlook they seem to
me to embody. This will set up an intellectual problem I want
to consider. Schlegel’s most basic intellectual impulse is
contrarian. He works best by combing through a writing and
tugging on a strand, pulling it loose for all to see. He has a
heterodox way of describing what he’s found that is baffling
but often quite compelling, if you have the will to make some
sense of it. He will begin his comments in the faculty
workshop with a shaggy-dog story, or some other
impenetrable remark, but then suddenly use it to explicate
the discussion’s motifs. Sometimes the comments are sharp,
even dismissive; sometimes they are humorous or selfconsciously ironic. Apparently, an exasperated member of
Yale’s faculty once blurted out, “Are you serious, or is this a
joke?”3 Schlegel is drawn in particular to biographical
explanations: explanations that connect ideas to friendships,
annoyances, uncareful remarks, household budgets, and
professional ambition and alienation. I am thinking of a
recent essay on Wesley Hohfeld that graciously spares us yet
PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY (1978); GEORG G. IGGERS, HISTORIOGRAPHY IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY: FROM SCIENTIFIC OBJECTIVITY TO THE POSTMODERN
CHALLENGE (1997).
2. See generally R. G. COLLINGWOOD, THE IDEA OF HISTORY (1st ed. 1946).
3. Charles Barzun and I both heard this story and included it in our first
drafts for this conference. Charles retained the precise language better, and I
have adopted his version here. As Charles recalled, Schlegel reportedly
responded, “Both.”
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another exposition of the “table of fundamental conceptions,”
exploring instead Hohfeld’s fascinating and rather desperate
efforts to construct an academic career as a “law professor.”4
At times, this interest in individuals subsumes everything
else, so that large-scale, historical forces are miniaturized
and inscribed on the surface of individual lives. Reviewing a
monograph he much admired on the legal realists at Yale,
Schlegel begins by flatly asserting, “Intellectual history is
the history of intellectuals.”5 What legal realism was, what
it came to as a theory, depended on who was hanging around
the school, “so that if the people change, the meaning may
change also.”6 But these accounts, as interesting as they are,
have a way of uprooting themselves, because Schlegel tends
to subject them to the same historicizing and contextualizing
treatment. After urging in the same review that text requires
context to be understood and that “texts are not selfdefining,” he adds in an aside, “(nor are contexts for that
matter)”—and then characteristically lets the matter drop.7
One comes to the end of a detailed discussion of the
“intimate” origins of the critical legal studies (CLS)
movement expecting a conclusion, but Schlegel just shrugs
his shoulders.8 In this respect, at least, his critical attitude
is egalitarian. And when he looks around and finds no one at
the annual conference who will acknowledge the threat of
regress, he grows “bored,” or maybe frustrated, and he moves

4. John Henry Schlegel, Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld: On the Difficulty of
Becoming a Law Professor, in THE LEGACY OF WESLEY HOHFELD: EDITED MAJOR
WORKS, SELECT PERSONAL PAPERS, AND ORIGINAL COMMENTARIES (Shyam
Balganesh et al. eds.) (forthcoming).
5. John Henry Schlegel, The Ten Thousand Dollar Question, 41 STAN. L. REV.
435, 435 (1989) [hereinafter Schlegel, Ten Thousand Dollar Question] (reviewing
LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960 (1986)).
6. Id. at 442.
7. Id. at 459.
8. See John Henry Schlegel, Notes Toward an Intimate, Opinionated, and
Affectionate History of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L. REV.
391, 401 (1984) (“Exactly what should be concluded about the organization and
its members from all of this is by no means clear.”).
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on.9 He seeks out people at the periphery who see the
problem. He finds a distraction. It is possible to avoid studies
that irritatingly refuse to acknowledge their own political
and moral commitments, but one ends up having to skip most
of the conference panels.
On a recent occasion I found myself playing hooky from
the annual meeting of legal historians at a pub down the
street from our hotel, tagging along while Schlegel met with
a group interested in foundational questions about history.
A number of different issues came up during the
conversation, but here I want to pursue one which we might
frame in the following way. Today we conventionally assume
that aspects of our identity like class, race, gender, and
sexual orientation influence how we see and understand the
world. We capture the particular kind of influence we mean
by using a metaphor. Identity, we say, forms a kind of
“perspective,” so that the world presents itself to each
individual somewhat differently, on analogy to the effect of
physical position and orientation on visual perception. We
say, Look, there are things that only someone like me can
understand! In this way, we attribute our judgments to our
perspective. When philosophers theorize about these ways of
speaking, the ideas they use most often are “objectivity” and
“subjectivity.” Identity is a source of basic empirical concepts
with which we make sense of the world, and, insofar as these
concepts are not widely shared, the judgments generated by
applying the concepts are “subjective.”10 Judgments can also
be subjective because a concept is indexical, like the
expressions “here,” “now,” “I,” and the demonstrative “this”:
9. See John Henry Schlegel, Sez Who? Critical Legal History Without a
Privileged Position, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL HISTORY 561–62 (Markus
D. Dubber & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2018) [hereinafter Schlegel, Sez Who?];
John Henry Schlegel, Saying Thanks with Some Self-Reflection, 69 BUFF. L. REV.
207, 208 (2021) [hereinafter Schlegel, Saying Thanks with Some Self-Reflection].
10. See generally A.W. MOORE, POINTS OF VIEW (1997); THOMAS NAGEL, THE
VIEW FROM NOWHERE (1986); BERNARD WILLIAMS, DESCARTES: THE PROJECT OF
PURE ENQUIRY (1978); BARRY STROUD, THE QUEST FOR REALITY: SUBJECTIVISM AND
THE METAPHYSICS OF COLOUR (2000).
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whether one speaks a truth when uttering one of these
expressions will depend on context—on where a person
physically is when she says, for example, “Here is where I
found the weapon.” Extending this idea, what it takes to
speak a truth about, say, whether an experience was
frightening will depend metaphorically on “where one is,”
that is, on how things appear from the particular perspective
of the speaker, in a sense of “perspective” that includes
aspects of the speaker’s identity, such as race, gender, and
life experience. That was really frightening, we might say,
and mean: for a person like me.
Historians have long wrestled with the question of
objectivity as well.11 For historians, as well as for
philosophers, one of the key questions is whether judgments
about the past can be sufficiently objective, that is, from a
shared perspective of some kind (even if not universal),
rather than the perspective of a particular historian.
Schlegel is interested in this question as well, but in contrast
to most of the writing on the topic, he has approached the
issue by distinguishing two notions of truth: (little-t) truth
and (big-T) Truth. Little-t truth, says Schlegel, is something
we attribute to a “conclusion[] of thought” to express our
“evaluation[] of its plausibility.”12 To say a conclusion is
“true” on Schlegel’s usage is to say we are “secure” in
thinking it—a description that seems to imply the existence
of a sound argument for the conclusion, or at least good
reasons in support. Since Schlegel accepts the conventional
wisdom that attributes our judgments to our perspective, he
accepts that different persons grasp different little-t truths,
although he sometimes expresses this idea by speaking of

11. See generally PETER NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE “OBJECTIVITY
QUESTION” AND THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION (1988).
12. John Henry Schlegel, If the Music Hadn’t Stopped, or Reflections on the
Great Kerfuffle: Historicism’s Continuing Grasp for Truth, 2 n.1 (Aug. 14, 2020)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) [hereinafter Schlegel, If the Music
Hadn’t Stopped].

138

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

different “understandings.”13
Little-t truths can be truths of perspective, and truths of
perspective can of course be non-exclusive. In contrast, for
Schlegel, big-T Truth is the way the world actually and
determinately is, apart from anyone’s perspective on it. It
always appears in the singular; since there is one world,
there is only one way it actually is apart from me or anyone
else, and there is one True account of it. Something like this
can be expressed by using a definite article and writing of
“the Truth.” One of the fundamental intellectual challenges
to history in the twentieth century has been substantiating
its relationship to the Truth.14 If a historian’s judgments are
the product of her perspective (just as any person’s are), then
how can she tell us the Truth about what happened in the
past? Which of the competing narratives tells us the Truth,
and how do we know?
In recent years, at least, Schlegel has tried to answer
these kinds of questions by staking out a middle ground. He
accepts that our judgments about the world are a product of
our perspective on it. Schlegel takes this as a necessary
feature of making judgments about the world; there is no
getting away from one’s perspective, at least in history.15
This means history cannot tell us about big-T Truth. Its role
is to enrich our understanding of the world, primarily by
telling narratives full of the little-t truths that emerge from
a close study of historical texts. We ought to give up our
worries about Truth, says Schlegel, and focus on telling
stories. The public will embrace this role for history: “Better
narratives, ones admitting their positionality and so their

13. In a footnote, Schlegel declines to endorse the “possibility of multiple
‘truths,’” because he doubts speaking that way will have an effect on “academic
discourse,” which treats truth as singular. Id. at 12 n.25. Whether or not he wants
to endorse the idea of “multiple truths,” his use of little-t truth does support the
idea, which Schlegel captures using other terms.
14. See IGGERS, supra note 1, at 118–33; ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 69–94;
NOVICK, supra note 11, at 469–521.
15. Schlegel, Sez Who?, supra note 9, at 16.
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partiality, ones claiming not to unveil a long suppressed
Truth, but to offer a different understanding of an
interesting, perhaps even relevant past, might showcase
what academic historians can do . . . .”16 One senses a core
value here: that good histories provide us with interesting,
challenging, richly detailed, and well-researched stories,
whose telling frees us from the intellectual domination of
Truth. Legal histories may destabilize efforts to rationalize
the law, but this is no cause for “resignation”—a label
proposed by Schlegel’s friend and former colleague, Bob
Gordon—but for contentedness, and for hope, since
destabilizing frees us from the intellectual domination of a
system.17 What of the worries of the CLS movement, whose
historians aimed to unmask legal systems by revealing the
Truth—that those systems worked to advance the interests
of those in power, to the great injury of others? Their
ambitions, Schlegel thinks, ought to be more modest.18 There
is no getting at Truth, because there is no way of making
judgments about the world apart from one’s perspective on
it. Indeed, Schlegel’s aversion for totalizing accounts—
explanations that appeal to exceptionless rules or laws—
would seem to apply to critical histories as much as to the
textbook narratives they aim to displace.19
Here is the intellectual problem I think this sketch leads
to: On Schlegel’s account of little-t truth, it is difficult to
make sense of how historical narratives can enrich our
“understanding” of the past without recourse to a notion like
16. Schlegel, If the Music Hadn’t Stopped, supra note 12, at 17.
17. See Robert W. Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J.
1017, 1036–37 (1981). Gordon writes, “[T]he resigned admit that legal
institutions, like all human works, are naturally imperfect, are always, because
of historical contingency, out-of-date, and are inevitably, because of social
complexity, problematic in their effects; but that’s life.” Id. at 1036. I can imagine
these exact words coming out of Schlegel’s mouth, accompanied by a shrug and a
“Sounds fine to me!”
18. See Schlegel, Sez Who?, supra note 9, at 15; Schlegel, Ten Thousand
Dollar Question, supra note 5, at 448–49.
19. Schlegel, Saying Thanks with Some Self-Reflection, supra note 9, at 210.
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big-T Truth. Schlegel wants to hold on to the idea that
history can contain errors and that we can identify these
errors and correct them.20 And he wants to hold on to the
importance of archival work for producing the kind of
innovative narratives that enhance our understanding of the
past. These advancements rest on amassing little-t truths.
But, of course, not every historical study does correct error
and enhance understanding; and so those that do must differ
somehow from those that do not. We surely are able to
express these differences, to analyze them and say what they
amount to. Book reviews would be much easier to write if all
one could say on the topic were, “This book enriches our
understanding of the origins of the federal Constitution.” But
something else must be said to justify the judgment. What
more must be said? Well, Schlegel’s notion of little-t truth
concerns whether we can be secure in drawing a certain
conclusion of thought. So what more must be said seems to
come to this: showing how we can be sure a previous history
got the past wrong by adducing historical sources to show
something about the past apart from the writing. To say a
new history enriches our understanding of the past requires
showing how we can be secure in accepting its conclusions,
which would seem again to require adducing historical
sources that establish this “security” by revealing something
about the past as it stands outside the writing. In this way,
our ordinary evaluations of historical studies as being better
or worse, as being erroneous or (little-t) truthful, as
enriching our understanding or not, seem to involve recourse
to the world as it stands apart from our perspective on it,
that is, to big-T Truth. They press outward to the very notion
Schlegel wants to avoid.
There is a second, related intellectual problem waiting
here as well. Our understanding of the past is not a heap of
unrelated narratives about different subjects, like the pile of
magazine back issues one finds at the dentist. Histories

20. Schlegel, If the Music Hadn’t Stopped, supra note 12, at 15–16.
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relate to one another in important ways that an account of
history-writing ought to explain. That relation does not
consist solely in historians shuffling between various schools;
there’s more to intellectual history than just a history of
intellectuals. Academic works of history in particular refer to
one another, implicitly and explicitly: they are always “in
conversation” with other histories, addressing interpretive
questions raised by earlier writings (or dismissing them),
engaging with prior histories’ selection and interpretation of
source material, and so on. Historiography is the study of
history-writing itself, and conventionally we approach it by
identifying different schools. And although historiography is
sometimes described as if different schools just followed one
another arbitrarily (a historiographical version of “one damn
thing after another”), this is not always the case. Sometimes
the conversation has a direction to it, and this direction can
be reconstructed in a way that reflects historians’
attachment to certain norms, values, and perceptions, which
embody a kind of rationality. After all, historians have
formed schools by systematically criticizing earlier bodies of
written work, just as book reviews do. A particularly
damning book review can end a school of thought and launch
its successor.21
I think there is a way to preserve the conventional
attribution of one’s judgments to one’s perspective while
answering these two problems. Let us assume, with Schlegel,
that there are at least some elements of our perspective that
we cannot leave behind or “transcend,” even intellectually.22
What we need is a way of thinking about the relationship
between different authors’ perspectives that does not involve
transcending those perspectives by reference to Truth.23 Put
21. The paradigmatic example is Noam Chomsky’s review of B.F. Skinner’s
work, “Verbal Behavior.” See Kenneth MacCorquodale, On Chomsky’s Review of
Skinner’s Verbal Behavior, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS BEHAV. 83, 83 (1970).
22. For arguments to this end, see Fred D’Agostino, Transcendence and
Conversation: Two Conceptions of Objectivity, 30 AM. PHIL. Q. 87, 95 (1993).
23. See id. at 89–96.
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another way, what we need is a way of making sense of how
histories are answerable to the past without supposing a bigT Truth that serves as a shared standard to correct them.
Our interest is in what can be called the normativity of
history: the rightness or wrongness of judgments about the
past. I suggest that we treat the normativity of history not
as a function of a relationship between our judgments and
the past as it was on its own, independent of our perspective
(the relation Schlegel calls “Truth”), but as the result of
certain social attitudes within the community of historians.
To my eye, nothing Schlegel has written is inconsistent with
this suggestion. Indeed, some things he has said are quite
close to the account I shall sketch here.24 It should be possible
for me to persuade Schlegel on this point, then, without
asking him to give up his basic commitments. So what is
there to recommend a social account of the possibility of
normativity in judgments about the past?
Here is the core intuition. Writing history is a social
undertaking. It is a form of associating with a community,
principally the community of historians. When someone
writes a history, she undertakes a commitment to justify her
claims about the past, and recognizes that the community of
historians will hold her responsible. They will form their own
views as to whether she satisfies this commitment. I’m
writing of “commitment” here in the singular, but of course
it’s multifaceted and one could easily use “commitments”
plural. Think of all the ways in which the success or failure
of a writing depends on the judgment of the community: what

24. See, e.g., Schlegel, Saying Thanks with Some Self-Reflection, supra note
9, at 213 (arguing that law is “a practice, an activity of humans exercising
judgment in a time and place when trying both to secure actions deemed by them
to be beneficial to themselves or detrimental to others,” and that “[l]aw enacts
the dominant culture”); Schlegel, Ten Thousand Dollar Question, supra note 5,
at 449 (“Things are because some group of people say they are . . . .
Understandings of the world change . . . because the individuals who do the
picturing either find a new understanding more conducive to their work or are in
the thrall of others who find that new understanding conducive to their interest,
or both.”).
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it takes to prove a claim about the past; what counts as
evidence in support of such a claim; how sources of historical
evidence ought to be identified, interpreted, and related to
one another; how the archive and its physical contents ought
to be understood and used; what is the range of permissible
questions to pose about the past; and what is the range of
permissible answers to offer to those questions. There is no
way to write a history without acknowledging the norms that
relate to these subjects, as well as the authority of the
community to make a judgment on the matter.25 We could
also speak of “communities” plural. While these judgments
belong principally to the community of historians, other
communities are also involved. Discussing the legal archive,
Paul Halliday observed that legal “authority . . . is made by
a community of actors,” whose study requires formulating “a
collective biography and a set of practices of a community
whose members created and mastered the archive out of
which authority was, is, and must continue to be made.”26 It
wasn’t only judges who invested prior cases with the
authority of “precedent,” thought Halliday; it was also the
clerks who created, managed, and used the legal archive.
And, of course, communities—real human communities—are
constantly in the process of fracturing and being reshaped,
sometimes by members themselves, sometimes by outside
actors or institutions. We will come to this in a moment. For
now, the core idea, the intuition, comes to this: that we can
explain how history is made answerable to the past by
appealing to a human social practice, namely, a practice in
which the author undertakes to justify her claims to the
satisfaction of a community whose judgment she recognizes
25. As Collingwood suggested, history concerns not the past in itself, but how
the past relates to historians’ thoughts. Collingwood probably meant the
individual historian, but we can reconstruct his account to refer to the community
of historians. See CARR, supra note 1, at 23–24.
26. Paul D. Halliday, Authority in the Archives, 1 CRITICAL ANALYSIS L. 110,
112 (2014); see also Ann Laura Stoler, Colonial Archives and the Arts of
Governance, 2 ARCHIVAL SCI. 87, 87, 90–91, 93 (2002) (describing archives as
“sites of . . . knowledge production” and “the production of history”).
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as being authoritative.
This is an intuition, but it is clearly a trained intuition,
in my case trained by a long (some would say unfortunate)
engagement with Hegel scholars during graduate school.27
Connections could be drawn to the Frankfurt School as well
(Habermas in particular), or to pragmatism. We can also see
connections with the body of psychological research
suggesting that the primary function of human reasoning is
to produce arguments persuasive to the community.28 But
perhaps it is artificial to let ourselves be guided by any of
these theories. What benefits are there to consciously
adopting an intellectual framework when thinking about
history? More pointedly, what benefits are there to posing
stuffy, systematic Hegel as some kind of “friendly
amendment” to our independent troublemaker, Schlegel?
I do think it is helpful to be clear about the basic picture
of normativity underlying this intuition. Normativity is a
human addition to the world, a result of voluntary human
actions of undertaking a responsibility and holding another
person to one. The picture is characteristic of Enlightenment
thinking, and in this regard, an account of history that
bottoms here is friendly to Enlightenment social and political
thought.29 On the other hand, there are clearly diminishing

27. This is the school of Pinkard, Pippin, and Brandom, who have offered a
non-metaphysical interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy. Pinkard, as I told
Schlegel, was a teacher of mine. He had come to the Northwestern Philosophy
Department in part because his friend Pippin had an appointment at the
University of Chicago. See, e.g., TERRY PINKARD, DOES HISTORY MAKE SENSE?
HEGEL ON THE HISTORICAL SHAPES OF JUSTICE 39–47 (2017) [hereinafter PINKARD,
HISTORY]; TERRY PINKARD, HEGEL’S PHENOMENOLOGY: THE SOCIALITY OF REASON
(1996); ROBERT B. BRANDOM, Some Pragmatist Themes in Hegel’s Idealism, in
TALES OF THE MIGHTY DEAD 210, 216–22 (2002) [hereinafter BRANDOM,
Pragmatist Themes]; ROBERT B. BRANDOM, MAKING IT EXPLICIT 39–64 (1994). For
a recent review of Pippin’s work that places his interpretation in the larger body
of Hegel scholarship, see Charlotte Baumann, Book Review, 27 BRIT. J. FOR HIST.
PHIL. 1256 (2019) (reviewing ROBERT PIPPIN, HEGEL’S REALM OF SHADOWS (2019)).
28. Hugo Mercier & Dan Sperber, Why Do Humans Reason? Arguments for
an Argumentative Theory, 34 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 57, 60 (2011).
29. SEE BRANDOM, Pragmatist Themes, supra note 27, at 218.
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returns, in this context, from continuing to refine the basic
picture—certainly to the degree that an academic
philosopher would ordinarily demand. Nor is my role here to
attempt such a thing. But if we work from the core intuition
that history is a kind of social undertaking, we can make
sense of at least some of what we ordinarily say about writing
history. We can discover some differences, too. Patterns of
similarity and difference in the rational reconstruction of our
ordinary ways of speaking and thinking are surely worth
noting, if only to achieve a degree of awareness about our
own practices; so let us see very briefly where the thought
takes us.
First, we can preserve the conventional attribution of an
individual’s judgments to her perspective, mentioned above,
as long as it is possible to reconstruct perspective as
membership in a set of overlapping communities. On this
approach, seeing the world from a particular point of view
entails undertaking commitments to which we are held
responsible by members of the various communities whose
authority on those subjects we recognize. We tend to credit
the judgments of humans in those communities because of
what we share with them. To see the world like us is to be a
member in a community with us, composed of individuals
similar in some salient way. This allows us to think about
perspective without being drawn into distinguishing little-t
and big-T versions of truth. This is probably a good thing. All
things being equal, we should prefer to say that there is one
sense of “true,” and to define the expression in its ordinary
sense, as the property of being in accordance with reality; we
can then employ a social account of normativity to explain
how attributions of such a property function in the context of
history-writing. Large-scale, global claims about the cause of
a major event are commitments of the same sort as smaller,
granular historical judgments, but the former are much
harder to discharge to the satisfaction of the community of
historians (potentially impossible). For similar reasons, we
should want to say that we know things about history, in an
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ordinary sense of “knowledge” that implies truth. This is
especially important to professional history, and not simply
to secure the department’s university budget. Denialism and
fabrication about the past are popular political tools today,
and professional history has an important role to play in
checking those practices. It can do this only if historians
speak sensibly about what we know about the past. Whether
we do know what we say we know about the past is settled,
of course, by the present attitudes of the larger community
of historians, applying the prevailing norms of the historical
method. Let me be clear that no particular philosophical
theory of truth is on offer here, although the approach is
friendly to “deflationist” and “internal” theories rather than
classical, metaphysically robust accounts. Rather, what is on
offer here is the core of a theory of how our claims to know
things about the past, as a result of historical research,
actually do answer to the past—of how a certain kind of
normativity is possible.
Understanding history as a social practice also allows us
to make sense of how history-writing changes. This was one
of the intellectual problems we considered above. It, too, has
a political aspect; it is not uncommon today to encounter
pundits or even public intellectuals pointing to paradigm
shifts as evidence that history does not answer to the past at
all, but merely to intellectual fads or the moral anxieties of
the present. Schlegel’s historical outlook, it must be said,
does little to combat this reaction. A history that cannot
contribute to the search for Truth, whose primary
contribution to our intellectual life is to supply new,
arresting stories, savors too much of the aesthetic and too
little of the epistemic. Schlegel can certainly explain how
new stories trigger changes in historians’ interests, but he
cannot explain the rationality of those changes—how change
responds to deficiencies in earlier accounts other than simple
incompleteness.
There is a significant variation within the community of
historians in attitudes about proper historical subjects and
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methods, even at a single point in time. We should be able to
explain at least some of these differences by appeal to
something other than differences in taste or “perspective.” In
the late 1990s, the editor of the Journal of American History,
David Thelen, engaged in a fascinating “experiment”: he
published an unedited submission by an eminent historian
on the subject of lynching, along with five signed referee
reports evaluating the piece’s suitability for publication in
the journal.30 At the outset, Thelen noted that readers of
JAH had repeatedly expressed interest in better
understanding “how and why we practice” history. The
submission, written by Joel Williamson, was well-suited to
the subject. It was highly biographical: it explored the
development of Williamson’s own historical understanding,
as he moved from a childhood view of lynching as an episode
in frontier justice to the realization, after a lengthy study of
manuscript sources, that it was “an established institution
in a whole and ongoing cultural complex shared by several
million white southerners,” as those men and women
attempted to solidify their political and social standing
relative to freed blacks.31 Thelen thought the account pushed
historians to “think about what we see and do not see, to
reflect on what in our experience we avoid, erase, or deny, as
well as what we focus on.”32 The referee reports cleaved along
race lines. David Blight, a white professor of history and
black studies then at Amherst College, thought the piece
important because it showed “how American historians
didn’t or couldn’t see lynching in their developing visions of
the past.”33 But Robin D. G. Kelley, a black historian then at
NYU, thought the piece “sets us back a decade” by its casual
and unexamined use of the word “we” in describing the
30. David Thelen, What We See and Can’t See in the Past: An Introduction, 83
J. AM. HIST. 1217, 1218 (1997).
31. Joel Williamson, Wounds Not Scars: Lynching, the National Conscience,
and the American Historian, 83 J. AM. HIST. 1221, 1229, 1236 (1997).
32. Thelen, supra note 30, at 1219.
33. Referees’ Reports, 83 J. AM. HIST. 1254, 1256 (1997).

148

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

evolution of American historians, while at the same time
overlooking the mass of early writing by African American
and Jewish historians on lynching in the south. It was
entrenching the exclusion of black historians on a subject
that remained a live memory in some black communities.34
The volume puts the entire process of creating
normativity in historical writing on view. Here we have a
leading historian reporting that his own judgment about
what counted as a profitable subject of historical study
reflected a set of attitudes nurtured by his early experiences
and education; that the understanding of lynching had been
erased in white communities in the wake of political
transformations in the south after 1915, some ten years
before the author’s birth; and that he had as a result largely
dismissed lynching and embraced segregation as the most
pressing question of southern social and political
development after the Civil War.35 The Civil Rights
movement further encouraged his study of segregation. It
was only by accident, in the course of this study, that he came
upon individual manuscript sources that he could not fit
within the conceptual structure of southern history he had
erected. The discovery was so powerful that, instead of
dismissing the documents as outliers, Williamson rejected
his entire framework and subject, and it was then that
Williamson began to see how southern whites had
constructed a racial ideology to justify their political use of
lynching and torture against blacks.36 Williamson’s
understanding of lynching had been moved by a realization
that he could not make good on his earlier commitments, and
in this respect a number of influential historians of the south
followed him.
Not all historians developed along the same path; not
everyone shared the same attitudes and the same
34. Id. at 1258, 1260.
35. Williamson, supra note 31, at 1227–35.
36. Id. at 1236–40.
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understanding of what constituted an appropriate
framework for studying the place of lynching in southern
politics and society. The referees who advised rejecting the
piece described a different set of intellectual influences.
Those influences produced a historical sensibility in which
lynching had a very different social and political meaning,
and judged against these standards, Williamson’s
admissions were embarrassing, retrogressive, exclusionary,
and “conceptually wrongheaded.”37 The simultaneous
publication of the referee reports placed these judgments in
conversation with one another, revealing the rational shape
of the struggle between them about the place of lynching in
American history and historiography.
I don’t think we should explain this encounter simply by
saying that Williamson and his interlocutors had different
“perspectives” on lynching. Nor should we say that they were
grasping different (little-t) “truths” or expressing different
“understandings.” The encounter showed more than mere
difference. We should say, I think, that what the JAH
experiment revealed was an ongoing shift in prevailing views
of lynching in southern history, triggered by a change in
historians themselves and in the community of historians.
The change was not simply a change in personnel, a matter
of old men retiring and being replaced by new men and
women. Nor was the change definitional; there was no set of
historical “givens”—no definitions or basic empirical
concepts constitutive of doing “southern history”—that
researchers simply abandoned.38 Rather, particular sources
and works of history exposed how the community’s dominant
attitudes about the proper subjects and methods of history
were unsatisfactory. What we saw, in short, was what
Hegelians have called a breakdown in the prevailing “order
of thought,” triggered by a failure to justify the response to
37. Referees’ Reports, supra note 33, at 1259, 1261.
38. On this use of “given” in the context of constitutional history, see
Jonathan Gienapp, The Myth of the Constitutional Given: Enumeration and
National Power at the Founding, 69 Am. U. L. Rev. F. 183, 183–84 (2020).
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an emerging body of historical evidence.39 This is at once a
process of determining what counts as a good work of written
history and who is a historian. What might be called the
political and social history of the discipline emerges as a
complement to historiography itself, as a means of
explaining the sense of the change in disciplinary norms.
One last point. The principal difference with ordinary
ways of speaking about history that emerges from this
framework concerns the place of moral evaluations in
historical writing. Professional historians commonly speak of
the importance of understanding the past on its own terms.40
On some occasions, this is meant as nothing more than an
endorsement of the importance of immersing oneself in the
archive and generating the sort of intuitive understanding
that this labor generates. On other occasions, however,
something stronger is meant: Butterfield, for example,
seemed to think the historian could by imagination
understand a past world in which an actor had moved or an
event taken place. The historical imagination is spoken of
like a kind of mental faculty that allows the historian to
access the past as it is apart from the historian’s present-day
perspective.41 Since moral judgments impose values and
concepts from the present day on past actors, they do not
grasp the past on its own terms. The most we can say about
actors in the past, wrote Butterfield, is that they were
“mak[ing] the best of it.”42 Yet it seems fanciful to pretend
that contemporary histories written by professional
historians do not contain moral judgments. Indeed, many
excellent works of history have a strong moral core—a
commitment to a set of moral values that do not derive from
historical sources—and part of what makes these writings
vigorous and rich is this morality. Emphasizing the

39. See PINKARD, HISTORY, supra note 27, at 18–20, 40–41.
40. See CARR, supra note 1, at 5–6.
41. BUTTERFIELD, supra note 1, at 9.
42. Id. at 88.
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importance of archival work cannot tilt into uncritical
acceptance of what one finds in a written document.43
Getting too close to the perspective of a past actor deprives
us of something that counts as understanding of his
conduct.44 If what counts as good and bad history depends on
the attitudes of the community of historians, we should
anticipate this kind of moral skepticism about the past.
Historians, like anyone else, hold moral and political views
about the present and the past, and it would be odd to expect
those views to exercise no influence on their attitudes about
historical writings that touch on the same subject.45 That
normativity in history has its source in the attitudes of
modern-day historians is the kernel of truth in presentism.
And while those attitudes concern judgments about the past,
they naturally draw on moral judgments about related
matters in the present.
*

*

*

If what makes history answerable to the past is the
attitudes of historians, then I owe a great deal to Jack
Schlegel. For as our law school unraveled in the past few
years, and most of its historians left, Schlegel stayed. And as
difficult as he sometimes was—he was sometimes
unreasonably difficult, I thought—he insisted on being my
community. There I was, wandering blindly, nearly alone,
fumbling with texts I could barely read, and he came by and
prodded. The whole thing was modest. We were, in his words,
“reasonably decent historians of the second or third order,”

43. See CARR, supra note 1, at 16.
44. See ACTON, supra note 1, at 351, 357 (“At every step we are met by
arguments which go to excuse, to palliate, to confound right and wrong . . . .
‘Beware of too much explaining, lest we end by too much excusing.’”).
45. For a review of some of the current debate about presentism and the
critical work of legal history, as well as an argument that history informs
contemporary debates about morality, justice, and public policy, see Daniel
Farbman, Reconstructing Local Government, 70 VAND. L. REV. 413, 482–83
(2017).
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but for including me in this distinction, I cannot thank him
enough: for it implied that I was writing history.

